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Abstract 
 
We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: 
(1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems.  Inconsistent with 
growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and 
that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program 
expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures 
toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay 
and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, 
we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.  
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1. Introduction 
Not-for-profit firms often maintain large endowments, and the determinants and 
consequences of this unusual feature have received little study. An endowment is a fund 
of cash and/or securities that the not-for-profit can use to finance current and future 
expenses. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether there are agency problems 
when not-for-profit firms (NFPs) hold excess endowment assets.1  
We use as a basis of our study the literature that explores agency problems related 
to cash holdings in for-profit firms (e.g., Jensen, 1986).  Evidence on whether excess cash 
results in agency problems in for-profit firms is mixed.  Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1994) document excessive investment and acquisition activity for eleven firms 
that experience a large cash windfall due to a legal settlement, and Harford (1999) finds 
that firms with excess cash are more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions. 
Further, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) show that the market valuation of a firm’s 
cash holdings is lower when agency problems are likely to be greater. In contrast, Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) document only modest evidence of greater 
spending on new projects and acquisitions for a large sample of firms with high excess 
cash. 
Whether cash-related agency problems are present to a greater or lesser extent in 
NFPs is an open question. On one hand, recent work by Fisman and Hubbard (2002) 
argues that donors serve an important monitoring role in NFPs and minimize agency 
costs. In addition, some of the more frequently cited cash-related agency problems in for-
profit firms, such as excessive risk-reducing acquisitions, are likely to be less prevalent in 
                                                 
1 From this point forward, we use the acronym NFP in place of “not-for-profit.” In this paper, we use the 
terms “not-for-profit” and “nonprofit” as synonyms. 
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not-for-profit firms. NFP managers may have weaker incentives to engage in risk-
reducing activities because less of their wealth is concentrated in firm-specific assets (i.e., 
the future compensation of both nonprofit and for-profit managers has a firm-specific 
element, but for-profit managers also have a large proportion of their wealth invested in 
firm-specific stock and options).   
On the other hand, cash-related agency problems are potentially exacerbated in 
NFPs because unlike for-profits, NFPs have no residual claimants with strong monitoring 
incentives. Further, cash endowment holdings by NFPs are, on average, substantially 
larger than cash holdings by for-profits.  In the spirit of Jensen (1986), Hansmann (1990, 
p. 36) suggests that to ensure private benefits such as a light workload and increased job 
security, NFP managers can have incentives to build endowments rather than provide 
current services.2 Finally, there is no feasible method of returning unnecessary cash 
holdings to donors. In other words, there is no analogue to the dividends and share 
repurchases that for-profit firms use to return funds to shareholders. 
Unlike shareholders in public firms, excess cash holdings can be costly to NFP 
donors even when agency problems and transaction costs are low. In the absence of 
agency problems and transaction costs, excess cash is not costly for public firm 
shareholders: The extra cash lowers risk and expected return, and shareholders can access 
the funds if needed by borrowing against the value of their shares. However, in NFPs, 
excess cash holdings have an opportunity cost for donors: Donors have no ability to 
borrow against these holdings and use the cash to fund projects in other areas or 
industries. Thus, to the extent that an NFP holds cash in excess of its own needs, other 
                                                 
2 This suggestion is one of many reasons Hansmann (1990) discusses for why universities may hold 
endowments.  
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NFPs can be under-funded.3 
We examine endowments in a broad sample of NFPs over the period from 1992 to 
2001. We use the model developed by Fisman and Hubbard (2002) to form expectations 
about firm-specific benchmark levels of endowment. We estimate a firm’s excess 
endowment as the residual from yearly regressions based on this model. An excess 
endowment can mean: (1) an endowment that is optimally larger in anticipation of firm-
specific growth opportunities; (2) an endowment that is optimally larger because of 
superior firm-specific monitoring; or (3) an endowment that is sub-optimally larger due 
to firm-specific agency problems. Our tests are designed to distinguish between these 
explanations. 
Inconsistent with large endowments anticipating greater firm-specific growth 
opportunities, we find that most firms with excess endowments maintain their excess 
endowments for several years (i.e., they do not draw down their endowments to fund 
growth). Furthermore, we find that firms with persistent excess endowments do not 
exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. We conclude that growth 
opportunities are unlikely to explain excess endowments for most NFPs, and that the 
large endowments suggest either better monitoring or agency problems.  
To distinguish between firm-specific better monitoring and agency problems as 
potential explanations for excess endowments, we first examine the relation between 
excess endowments and firm efficiency, which we measure using program expenses as a 
fraction of total expenses (the program expense ratio). This ratio is a widely used proxy 
for the efficiency with which total expenses are made toward charity instead of toward 
                                                 
3 Hansmann (1980, pp. 14-19) discusses the trade-off of the costs and benefits of deferring charitable 
spending. 
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fundraising and administration. Consistent with greater agency problems in firms with 
excess endowment, we find that the program expense ratio is lower for firms with excess 
endowments. As a second test to distinguish between the better monitoring and agency 
problem explanations, we examine the relation between excess endowments and CEO 
and total officer and director pay as proxies for private benefits accruing to management. 
We find a positive association between excess endowments and compensation, which 
again is inconsistent with the better monitoring explanation.  Our overall evidence 
suggests that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems. 
Our research builds on recent work by Fisman and Hubbard (2002). Like Fisman 
and Hubbard, we assume donors wish to maximize the efficiency with which charitable 
goods are delivered over time.  To do this, donors choose an endowment size that 
maximizes (1) the benefits of endowment funds as a buffer to smooth production of the 
charitable good, net of (2) the agency costs of endowment funds, which include delays in 
the provision of the charitable good to beneficiaries and the potential for managers to 
divert assets for their private benefit.  
In contrast to Fisman and Hubbard’s (2002) emphasis on modeling expected 
endowments, our focus is on examining the consequences of excess endowments, and 
whether they are associated with agency problems. This approach is similar to that of 
Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999), who recognize that the target level of cash 
holdings is expected to vary cross-sectionally in for-profit firms, but that deviations from 
target levels do sometimes exist and can be associated with agency problems.  Our 
findings are consistent with the for-profit literature that documents agency problems in 
firms with excess cash holdings. However, unlike the for-profit literature, we find no 
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evidence that managers use excess endowments to increase investment. Instead, excess 
endowments are highly persistent over time, much more so than in for-profit firms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer 
background on NFPs and review the related literature. We define our hypotheses in 
Section 3. We describe our data and research design in Section 4, and present the results 
of our tests in Section 5. We provide sensitivity tests of our results in Section 6. In 
Section 7, we provide a summary and concluding remarks.  
2. Background on charitable not-for-profits and literature review 
The defining feature of not-for-profit organizations is not that they cannot make 
profits – in fact, many do – it is that they are prohibited from distributing their profits to 
anyone who exercises control over the firm (Hansmann, 1980, 1996). This “non-
distribution constraint” means that no parties have a claim to a NFP’s residual earnings. 
Consequently, NFPs have no shareholders and cannot issue equity.  
However, “instead of issuing shares, NFPs can raise ‘equity’” through 
contributions from donors (Gentry, 2002, p. 847).  Analogous to cash and marketable 
securities in a for-profit firm, the endowment consists of past donations, past profits, and 
other capital that has been accumulated, but not expended, in the NFP’s operations.  
Thus, similar to a shareholder in a for-profit firm, a donor provides equity capital, but 
unlike the shareholder, the donor has no ability to require the return of that capital if cash 
balances grow too large. Further, because the endowment comes from current and past 
donors, it would be difficult for the NFP to return donations even if it so desired. Finally, 
adverse tax consequences to the donors likely render any return of cash to donors 
undesirable. 
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The fact that NFPs have no residual claimants does not imply that these 
organizations are without effective monitors. Donors, particularly those making large 
contributions, often have control rights over the firms even though they do not have 
residual claims. For example, large donors often sit on NFP boards (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). The fact that large donors have chosen to invest their private capital in a particular 
NFP also suggests that these benefactors have a stake in effectively carrying out the 
NFP’s mission.   
Hansmann (1990), in a discussion of university endowments, examines a number 
of reasons why a NFP may accumulate endowment assets.  One reason offered is 
precautionary savings – the endowment assets provide a “financial buffer” (p. 39) against 
periods of financial adversity, and allow the firm to maintain a constant level of services 
in the face of fluctuating expenses and income from donations and other sources. This 
precautionary savings explanation is similar to the theory in the for-profit literature to 
explain corporate cash holdings (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Harford, 1999; Opler et 
al., 1999).  
Fisman and Hubbard (2002) formalize a model of optimal endowment size where 
firms trade off the benefits of precautionary savings as a buffer to smooth production 
against the agency costs of endowment funds. They predict and find that donors allow 
firms to hold larger endowments when their operating environment is characterized by 
highly uncertain cash flows, limited alternative sources of financing, and large fixed 
costs. These determinants are analogous to the for-profit literature on corporate cash 
holdings (Harford, 1999; Opler et al., 1999), where firms bear costs when they 
experience a shortage of funds necessary to carry out their operating and investing 
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activities. As discussed below, we use the Fisman and Hubbard (2002) model to estimate 
expected endowment levels in NFPs.  
3.  Hypothesis development  
Holding aside temporary shocks to donations or revenues, there are three reasons 
that an NFP can hold an endowment that is larger than predicted by the Fisman and 
Hubbard model. First, the Fisman and Hubbard model does not control for growth 
options, and it can be optimal for an NFP to build a large endowment to fund anticipated 
growth. For example, before constructing a building, an NFP may save for a portion of 
the cost in its endowment.  A second reason that a firm can hold an excess endowment is 
because of firm-specific advantages in monitoring management’s use of endowment 
funds. Fisman and Hubbard predict that when monitoring quality is high, donors may 
allow NFP managers to hold larger than normal endowments because the donors are less 
concerned about the agency costs of excess endowments. On the other hand, high 
monitoring quality may indicate that donors are able to prevent managers from holding 
excess endowments (Opler et al. 1999, p. 12). A third reason for excess endowments is 
agency problems.   
We expect that when donors are active and efficient monitors, NFP endowments 
are optimal, on average. However, similar to the arguments made by Harford (1999) and 
Opler et al. (1999) about cash holdings in the for-profit literature and by Hansmann 
(1990) in the NFP literature, we predict that managers attempt to increase the endowment 
beyond the optimal level so as to increase their scope for discretion. Further, consistent 
with Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s (1994) findings on firms experiencing 
cash flow windfalls, we note that a positive exogenous shock to cash flows or asset value 
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can also increase the endowment and, in turn, increase managers’ scope for discretion. 
Thus, excess endowments can signal the existence of agency problems.4  
Managers of NFPs have four primary options when faced with excess endowment 
assets: (1) continue to hold the excess endowment assets; (2) invest in fixed assets that 
expand the production capacity of the firm; (3) increase program expenditures; or (4) 
consume assets for their private benefit in the form of excess compensation or 
perquisites. We examine how managers use excess assets and provide evidence on 
whether the excess assets are the consequence of growth options or better monitoring, or 
if they instead reflect agency problems.  
If excess endowments primarily occur because of anticipated growth 
opportunities, we do not expect excess endowments to be persistent. To provide evidence 
on whether excess endowments are associated with growth opportunities, we examine 
whether firms with excess endowments increase program expenses at a faster rate and 
make greater investments in fixed assets than firms with smaller endowments. When 
managers increase program expenses, it is clear that they act in donors’ interests. Growth 
in fixed assets is more ambiguous, since managers may invest optimally to expand the 
scope of the programs they offer, or they may over-invest as a means of increasing 
perquisite consumption.  We will interpret increases in both program expenses and 
investment as evidence of realized growth options.  On the other hand, if we find that 
excess endowments are persistent, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do 
                                                 
4 Although our maintained assumption is that donors seek to maximize the efficiency of charitable services, 
it is important to note that not all donors will have this preference. Some donors may wish to use the charity 
as a vehicle for their own private consumption, and may as a result prefer a build-up of endowment assets. 
(Analogously in a public firm, one can imagine that a large shareholder, because of induced risk aversion, 
could prefer that the firm maintain large cash holdings.) For example, some donors may contribute assets 
and restrict their use so that the donor's name may be prominently displayed by the NFP for a long period 
of time. To address this possibility, we examine unrestricted endowment assets in sensitivity tests below. 
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not invest nor increase program expenses, this suggests that growth opportunities are not 
the reason for excess endowments. In this case, larger than usual endowments suggest 
either better than usual monitoring or the existence of agency problems. 
To distinguish between better monitoring and agency problems, we examine the 
relation between excess endowments and firm efficiency. Our proxy for firm efficiency is 
program expenses as a fraction of total expenses (the sum of program, fundraising, and 
administrative expenses). This program expense ratio measures the efficiency with which 
total expenses are made toward production of the charitable good (programs) instead of 
being used for fundraising and administration.  The program expense ratio is a widely 
used measure of efficiency in NFPs (e.g., Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986; Posnett and 
Sandler, 1989; Tinkelman, 1998 and 1999; Baber, Daniel and Roberts, 2002; Krishnan, 
Yetman and Yetman, 2004), and has been used in prior studies examining the relation 
between governance quality and NFP performance (e.g., Callen, Klein, and Tinkelman, 
2003; Desai and Yetman, 2005). If excess endowments signal better monitoring, we 
expect a positive, or no, relation between excess endowments and the program expense 
ratio.  This follows because better monitoring should prevent potential inefficiencies that 
might otherwise result from holding large endowments. On the other hand, a finding of a 
negative relation between excess endowment assets and the program expense ratio is 
inconsistent with better monitoring, and suggests greater agency problems. We test the 
following hypothesis stated in null form: 
H1:   The ratio of program expenses to total expenses is unrelated to firms’ 
excess endowment assets, ceteris paribus. 
 
If we find that firms with excess endowments operate less efficiently, it is 
interesting to consider how managers benefit from these agency problems. We expect 
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that if excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems, managers will 
either shirk or consume assets for their private benefit in the form of excess compensation 
or perquisites. Fisman and Hubbard (2002, p.8) allude to these types of endowment-
related agency problems by their assumption “that it is easier for managers to pursue 
personal interests with endowment funds rather than streams of revenue.” With respect to 
compensation, we test the following hypothesis, again stated in null form: 
H2:  Managerial compensation is unrelated to firms’ excess endowment assets, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
In addition to testing for a relation between agency problems and managerial 
compensation, it would be interesting to examine the relation between agency problems 
and managerial perquisite consumption. As described below, our compensation measure 
does include monetary values for perquisites such as the personal use of housing or 
automobiles. However, we do not have data on perquisites such as a light workload and 
increased job security. Because we are conducting our study within NFP firms, we expect 
that even though these managers may receive lower pay than at similar for-profit firms, 
their direct pay including tangible perquisites is an important part of their compensation 
and may contain evidence about agency problems. 
4.  Sample selection and data description 
We use a sample of charitable not-for-profit organizations (also known as 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations). Although these firms are tax-exempt, they must file 
an annual Form 990 with the IRS, and we use data from these returns. A database of NFP 
filings is provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) through the 
Statistics of Income (SOI) files of the IRS for the years 1982 to 2001. We restrict our 
attention to the years beginning in 1992 when CEO compensation became available. 
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These data contain all 501(c)(3) organizations with more than $10 million in assets plus a 
random sample of about 4,000 smaller organizations. Our beginning sample consists of 
124,752 firm-year organizations from 1992 to 2001. We exclude grant-making 
foundations, mutual organizations, and organizations whose industry is “unknown” 
(classified as ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’ respectively by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE) industry classification system).  
 We delete observations with apparent coding errors: those that report negative 
values of total contributions, total revenues, program expenses, total expenses, 
investment securities, total assets, total liabilities and top officer compensation. We also 
exclude observations that do not have the four prior years of data that we need to 
compute volatility of total revenue (a control in the endowment model described in the 
next section). This restriction reduces the sample size to 91,140 observations.  From this 
sample, we match 49,556 firm-year observations with available CEO compensation data. 
The CEO compensation data is not available from the NCCS for all firms, and the 
reduction in our sample size is similar to the reduction in Fisman and Hubbard (2002) 
and Hallock (2002). Finally, we delete 7,804 firm-year observations that report CEO 
compensation, but not compensation for all officers as a group, since this is a logical 
inconsistency and apparent data error. The final sample used to estimate the endowment 
model shown in Equation (1) below consists of 41,752 firm-year observations from 8,727 
different organizations.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of observations for the four major industries 
according to the NTEE industry classification. As in Fisman and Hubbard (2002) and in 
Hallock (2002), our sample is concentrated in Health (35.6%) and Education (26.1%). 
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The table presents median values for endowment as a multiple of total expenses. This 
measure can be interpreted as the number of years that the organization would be able to 
fund its expenses without additional revenues. Median endowment scaled by expenses 
ranges from a low of 0.24 for ‘Health’ firms up to 1.34 for ‘Arts’ firms. In contrast, 
existing research documents much smaller cash holdings in for-profit firms. For example, 
Opler et al. (1999) report median cash holdings scaled by non-cash assets of 0.065 across 
their sample of for-profit firms, which is much smaller than the median endowment 
scaled by non-endowment assets of 0.47 in our sample (untabulated).   
The remaining columns present median data on total revenues, total expenses, 
investment growth, program expense growth, program expenses, CEO compensation, and 
officer and director compensation. Median investment growth (program expense growth) 
ranges from 4% (4%) of total expenses in the ‘Arts’ industry to 7% (5%) in the 
‘Education’ industry.  Median program expenses as a fraction of total expenses is the 
smallest in the ‘Arts’ industry at 75.64% and the largest in the ‘Human Services’ industry 
at 86.39%. Median CEO compensation ranges from a high of $215,520 in the ‘Health’ 
industry to a low of $104,140 in the ‘Human Services’ industry. These across-industry 
differences emphasize the importance of controlling for industry variation in 
endowments, program expenses, and compensation.  Finally, the table also presents 
descriptive statistics for the total sample. 
Insert Table 1 here 
5.  Methodology and results 
5.1.  Expectation model for endowment size 
We estimate a benchmark model for endowment that follows Fisman and 
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Hubbard (2002) and is analogous to the model estimated for public firms by Opler et al. 
(1999). We expect endowments to be larger in firms with more uncertain cash flows, in 
smaller firms, and in firms with limited alternative sources of financing.  
Consistent with Fisman and Hubbard, we model the ratio of endowment to total 
expenses. We measure endowment (Endow/Exp) as the sum of cash, savings, and 
investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) 
deflated by total expenses (line 17).5 Because we are interested in the potential agency 
costs of excess liquid assets, and to be consistent with the for-profit literature on agency 
costs of excess cash holdings, we exclude less liquid assets such as inventory, land, 
buildings, and equipment. 
Firms with uncertain cash flows require a greater buffer of precautionary funds. 
We proxy for cash flow uncertainty using the coefficient of variation of total revenue 
(CVREV) (line 12). CVREV is the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue to mean 
total revenue, both measured over the five years ending at year t. We require at least four 
annual observations of total revenues prior to year t for our computation, and if less 
historical data are available, we delete the observation.  
Firms with alternative financing sources require less precautionary funds. We 
proxy for access to financing sources using an Access to Debt variable coded ‘1’ if the 
firm has obtained debt in the last ten years ending at year t, and ‘0’ otherwise. We 
categorize a firm as having debt if the firm reports tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a, 
column (b)) or mortgages and other notes payable (line 64b, column (b)). Following 
Fisman and Hubbard, we also interact the Access to Debt variable with CVREV with the 
                                                 
5 Line numbers refer to lines on the IRS Form 990. 
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expectation that cash flow uncertainty requires a smaller buffer of funds when firms have 
access to alternative financing sources. 
We control for variation in monitoring across states using state fixed effects in the 
model. These indicator variables also control for state-specific differences in donor 
income and firm growth opportunities. Fisman and Hubbard (2002) proxy for monitoring 
with an index of state regulatory oversight, and Desai and Yetman (2005) proxy for 
monitoring with indices of state-level legal and reporting requirements. Because these 
indices of regulation, legal and reporting requirements are count variables of state level 
attributes, they can be expressed as linear combinations of state indicator variables. 
Accordingly, our state indicators capture the same variation in monitoring as these other 
indices.6 
Firms with more cash inflows may temporarily hold more cash, and larger firms 
need less precautionary savings (Opler et al., 1999). We control for these size effects 
using the natural logarithm of total revenue (line 12). In addition to state effects, we also 
control for industry and year fixed effects in the model. The industry (year) effects 
control for industry-specific (year-specific) differences in donor income, regulation and 
monitoring, and firm growth opportunities. The benchmark endowment regression is: 
Endow/Expit = β0 + β1*CVREVit + β2*LogRevenueit + β3*Access to Debtit  
+ β4*(Access to Debtit)* CVREVit + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.    (1) 
 
We winsorize all variables by year at the 1% and 99% levels (i.e., for each 
variable we re-assign its value if it is less (greater) than the 1st (99th) percentile to the 
value of the 1st (99th) percentile in a given year) to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
                                                 
6 Because the state indicators capture differences across states in monitoring, as well as differences in 
income, growth, and other factors, they cannot be directly interpreted as monitoring effects as the indices 
can; however, this interpretation is not a focus for our study.  
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Table 2 – Column I presents the results of the expectation model for endowments 
described by Equation (1). Year, state, and industry dummies are included in the 
regression models but are not tabulated. In all regression specifications, we use Huber-
White robust standard errors clustered by firm. These standard errors are a generalization 
of the White (1980) standard errors and are robust to both serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993). All explanatory variables are statistically significant in 
the predicted direction. The total explanatory power of the model (R-square of 23.7%) is 
comparable to R-squares ranging from 23% to 24% in Fishman and Hubbard’s (2002) 
Table 4. The results support the precautionary savings theory of endowment, in which 
firms with more volatile cash flows accumulate larger endowments, and large firms and 
firms with access to debt have lower endowment levels. Finally, we find that the 
interaction between the Access to Debt and CVREV is negative and significant, consistent 
with the hypothesis that access to finance alleviates the necessity to accumulate 
endowment in order to self-protect from cash-flow volatility.7  
Because variable costs can be cut quickly in the event of financial distress, 
Fisman and Hubbard also predict that endowments are smaller for firms with a greater 
proportion of variable costs. To proxy for lower variable costs within the organization, 
they compute a labor intensity variable, and predict a negative association between this 
variable and endowment. We do not include this variable in our primary model because 
one of our hypotheses predicts that excess endowments are associated with 
compensation-related agency problems, and total wages is potentially a measure of 
                                                 
7 A concern with the Access to Debt variable is that it may be endogenous to endowments, i.e., a larger 
endowment makes it easier to obtain debt.  To address this concern, we remove the Access to Debt variable, 
and estimate the remainder of the endowment model as a reduced form.  If we use this model for 
computing abnormal endowment, all of our results below in Tables 3 to 8 are qualitatively the same.  
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agency problems (Bertrand and Mullanaithan, 2003). However, for comparison with 
Fisman and Hubbard, in Column II we tabulate the endowment model including labor 
intensity (LABOR%), measured as total compensation for all employees including 
salaries, pension plan contributions, benefits and taxes (lines 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + 29, 
column (a)). We express this variable as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). As 
expected, LABOR% is negatively related to endowment. The estimated coefficients for 
the remaining variables are very similar to the ones reported in Column I, and have the 
expected sign. In sensitivity tests, we find that none of our inferences are affected if 
instead we use the model in Column II to obtain our estimates of excess endowments.  
We consider the regression in Table 2 - Column I to be a reasonable expectations 
model for the benchmark endowment held by a firm. We estimate a firm’s excess 
endowment as the residual from yearly regressions using this model. That is, a firm with 
a positive (negative) residual in a given year is assumed to hold more (less) endowment 
than the benchmark level. As discussed above, a residual endowment can mean: (1) an 
endowment that is optimally larger because of firm-specific growth opportunities; (2) an 
endowment that is optimally larger because firm-specific monitoring is better; or (3) an 
endowment that is sub-optimally larger that can indicate firm-specific agency problems. 
Our empirical tests in the next two sections are designed to distinguish these alternatives.  
Insert Table 2 here 
5.2 The association between excess endowments and growth opportunities 
To examine whether excess endowments are associated with growth 
opportunities, we follow Opler et al. (1999) and examine the persistence of excess 
endowments over time. We divide our sample firms into quartiles based on excess 
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endowment every year. We then track the firms over the next five years to determine 
which excess endowment quartile the firm belongs to in the subsequent years.  
In Table 3, we present the persistence of excess endowment for firms selected 
based on the first time they enter the highest quartile of excess endowment. We find that 
74.7% of the high endowment firms remain in the top quartile of excess endowment in 
the following year, and 62.2% of the high endowment firms remain in the top quartile 
group five years later. The persistence of excess endowment is substantially higher than 
the persistence of excess cash holdings documented in for-profit firms by Opler et al. 
(1999), who find that only 39% of the for-profit firms remain in the top quartile group 
five years later. 
Insert Table 3 here 
The results in Table 3 are not consistent with the explanation that excess 
endowments are built up in anticipation of growth opportunities. To further investigate 
whether excess endowments are associated with growth opportunities, we examine 
growth in investment and growth in program expenses over one- and two-year periods 
following the measurement of excess endowment. We measure investments in property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE GR) as the change in land, buildings, and equipment (line 
57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column (a)). PROGRAM GR is the change in 
program services expenses (line 13). We compute PPE GR and PROGRAM GR for both 
one year (from year t-1 to t) and two years (from t-1 to t+1). To compare the growth 
across firms, we divide each measure by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply 
it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. 
To examine the relation between excess endowment and growth, we use 
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regression models of the following form:   
(Dependent Variablen)it =  β0 + β1*Log Expenses it-1 + β2* Q4 Ex Endowit-1 +  
                                           Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.           (2) 
 
where Dependent Variablen represents either PPE GR% or PROGRAM GR%. Q4 Ex 
Endowit-1 is an indicator variable that indicates an excess endowment: It is coded as ‘1’ if 
the excess endowment is in the top quartile of the distribution in the year it is measured, 
and ‘0’ otherwise. We control for firm size using Log Expensesit-1, the natural logarithm 
of prior-year total expenses (line 17). We also control for year, state, and industry fixed 
effects in the model. 
 The first (fourth) column of Table 4 shows the results of estimating Equation (2) 
with one-year PPE GR% (one-year PROGRAM GR%) as the dependent variable. In each 
case, the regression indicates that firms with endowments in the upper quartile invest 
about 2% of expenses more in new PPE and add about 2% more in new program 
expenses than do the remaining three quartiles of firms with smaller endowments.  
To explore whether this extra investment is attributable to firms with transitory 
excess endowments, we partition firms into a persistent excess endowment group 
(Persistent Ex Endowt-1) and a transitory excess endowment group (Transitory Ex 
Endowt-1). We code an excess endowment as persistent if it remains in the top quartile of 
the distribution two years ahead, and transitory otherwise. The second and fifth columns 
of Table 4 show the results of estimating regressions for one-year PPE GR% and one-
year PROGRAM GR% respectively, that distinguish between persistent and transitory 
endowments.  The number of observations is smaller in these regressions because of the 
requirement that we observe endowment at t+1. Consistent with a build-up and 
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subsequent liquidation of endowments to fund growth, firms with transitory endowments 
show significantly greater one-year growth in investments and program expenses.  The 
third and sixth columns show that these firms exhibit significantly greater two-year 
growth as well.  
In contrast, firms with persistent excess endowments do not show substantial 
growth in investment or program.  Two-year growth rates are not significantly different 
from zero.  Although there is a significant one-year growth rates in program expenses 
firms with persistent excess endowments, its magnitude of 0.69% is economically small. 
Insert Table 4 here 
To summarize this section, we find that for most firms with excess endowments, 
the excess endowments are persistent. Firms with persistent excess endowments do not 
invest more nor increase program expenses. This evidence suggests that growth 
opportunities are not the reason for excess endowments for most firms. For these firms, 
large endowments suggest either better monitoring or agency problems. 
5.3 Tests to discriminate between better monitoring and agency problems  
To distinguish between better monitoring and agency problems, we conduct tests 
of Hypotheses 1 and 2 that examine the relation between excess endowments and both 
program expenses and executive compensation. To test Hypothesis 1, we measure the 
program expense ratio, PROG EXP RATIO, as total program services expenses (line 13) 
as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). As discussed above, this ratio is widely used 
as a measure of efficiency and performance both by donors and by previous researchers. 
A high proportion of program expenses to total expenses, which is the same as a low 
proportion of management, general and fundraising expenses to total expenses, means 
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that the organization is efficiently delivering services to maximize the charitable good. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we construct two measures of managerial compensation. 
Our first measure is total CEO compensation, CEO COMP, computed as the natural 
logarithm of CEO compensation. This measure includes: (1) “salary, fees, and bonuses” 
(Part V, column (c)), (2) contributions to employee benefit plans and deferred 
compensation (Part V, column (d)), and (3) expense account and other8 (Part V, column 
(e)).9 Second, we compute the fraction of total expenses attributable to the compensation 
of top executives. O&D COMP% is officer and director  compensation (line 25, column 
(a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). 
We examine the association between excess endowment and the three dependent 
variables using regression models of the following form:   
(Dependent Variablen)it =  β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Ex Endowit-1  
                                            + Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.      (3) 
 
(Dependent Variablen)it =  β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Positive Ex Endowit-1 +  
                                          β3* Negative Ex Endow it-1 + 
                                          Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.            (4) 
 
(Dependent Variablen)it =  β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Q4 Ex Endowit-1 +  
                                           Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.           (5) 
 
where Dependent Variablen represents either PROG EXP RATIO, CEO COMP, or O&D 
COMP%.  
In Model (3), we use a continuous measure of the excess endowment measure, Ex 
Endowit-1, which is simply the residual from the benchmark endowment model described 
                                                 
8 As described in the instructions to IRS Form 990, this amount includes expense account reimbursements 
and perquisites such as "the value of the personal use of housing, automobiles, or other assets owned or 
leased by the organization (or provided for the organization's use without charge), as well as any taxable or 
nontaxable fringe benefits)." 
9 "Part" positions refer to parts of IRS Form 990. 
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by Equation (1).  Model (4) is a spline regression with an inflection point at zero. Positive 
(Negative) Ex Endowit-1 is Ex Endowit-1 if Ex Endowit-1 is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ 
otherwise. This specification is consistent with Opler et al.’s (1999) capital expenditure 
regressions that allow different coefficients on positive and negative excess cash holdings 
(see their Table 8, pp. 36-37). In Model (5), we measure excess endowment as an 
indicator variable, Q4 Ex Endowit-1, coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment is in the top 
quartile of the distribution in the year it is measured, and ‘0’ otherwise. Under the 
assumption that we measure excess endowment with error, as compared to a continuous 
measure, this variable may allow for a more powerful test of whether agency problems 
are more severe in firms with the largest excess endowments. This last approach follows 
Opler et al. (1999) who find that capital expenditures and acquisitions are greatest in the 
highest quartile of excess cash holdings, and Harford (1999) who examines 
characteristics of “cash rich” firms with very large excess cash holdings.  
We expect the coefficients on Ex Endowit-1 and Q4 Ex Endowit-1 to be negatively 
related to PROG EXP RATIOit if there are agency problems. This follows because firms 
with agency problems have lower operating efficiency. We predict that the sign of the 
coefficient on Positive Ex Endowit-1 is negative, and the sign of the coefficient on 
Negative Ex Endowit-1 is zero. Like Opler et al. (1999), we expect that cash-related 
agency problems reside primarily in firms with excess cash holdings. 
When CEO COMPit and O&D COMP%it are the dependent variables, we expect 
the coefficients on Ex Endowit-1 and Q4 Ex Endowit-1 to be positive if firms with large 
excess endowments suffer from agency problems that result in excess managerial 
compensation. Based on our expectation that cash-related agency problems reside 
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primarily in firms with excess cash holdings, we predict the sign of the coefficient on 
Positive Ex Endowit-1 is positive, and the sign of the coefficient on Negative Ex Endowit-1 
is zero.  
In each model, Controls refers to our control variables for the expected level of 
each dependent variable in the absence of agency problems. We expect that firm size, 
industry membership, and location are important determinants of all of the dependent 
variables.  We control for firm size using Log Expensesit-1, the natural logarithm of prior-
year total expenses (line 17). As above, we control for variation in monitoring across 
states using state fixed effects in the model. These indicator variables also help control 
for state-specific differences in donor income and firm growth opportunities. We also 
include industry effects in all models to help control for industry-specific differences in 
income, regulation and monitoring, and firm growth opportunities. Finally, we include 
year indicators in the regression to control for differences over time.  
In addition, in the program expense ratio regressions, we include controls for 
potential manipulation of program expense accounting. Krishnan et al. (2004) present 
evidence consistent with charities overstating program expenses to appear more efficient, 
and with weaker charities engaging in more of this manipulation. A potential concern 
with our tests is that a negative relation between excess endowments and program 
expenses could reflect upward manipulation by under-endowed firms (weaker firms) 
rather than inefficiency by over-endowed firms. To address this concern, we include as 
controls the two variables Krishnan et al. show to be associated with manipulation: (1) 
Contributions%it-1 (the ratio of total contributions (line 1d) to total revenue (line 12)), and 
(2) Liabilitiesit-1 (total liabilities (line 66) divided by total assets (line 59)). Total 
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contributions includes both private donations from individuals and corporate, and 
government grants. 
In the compensation regressions, we include a control for performance. Hallock 
(2002) finds that outside fundraising is the performance measure that best explains CEO 
compensation in NFPs. Thus, in the CEO COMPit and O&D COMP%it regressions, we 
follow Hallock (2002) and use the logarithm of total contributions (line 1d) in the current 
year to control for outside fundraising in addition to our controls for size, industry, year, 
and state effects.10  To avoid losing 4,508 observations due to taking the logarithm of 
zero, we include an indicator variable, Zero Contributionsit, equal to 1 if outside 
fundraising is zero, and 0 otherwise. We then measure Log Contributionsit as the log of 
total contributions if positive, and 0 otherwise.  In sensitivity tests, we also include an 
additional control for growth opportunities in our pay regressions by including the one-
year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenditures. 
All variables in Equations (3), (4) and (5) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
5.4 The association between excess endowments and the program expense ratio  
In Table 5, we test Hypothesis 1 and present results from OLS regressions of 
PROG EXP RATIO on proxies for excess endowment and control variables. As described 
in Section 5.3, we tabulate three model specifications with different variables and 
functional forms for excess endowment. Fiscal year, state, and industry dummies are 
included in the regression models but are not tabulated. As above, in all regression 
                                                 
10 In unreported tests, we include change in net income (either scaled by sales or assets) as an additional 
performance measure. Consistent with Hallock (2002), we find that this measure has no significant positive 
association with pay, and does not affect the inference from our excess endowment variables. 
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specifications, we use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. These 
standard errors are a generalization of the White (1980) standard errors and are robust to 
both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993). 
In Table 5, PROG EXP RATIO is positively correlated with total expenses in all 
specifications. Because total expenses are the sum of program expenses, management 
expenses, and fundraising expenses, this finding suggests that larger firms are more 
efficient in that a larger fraction of each dollar of expenses goes toward program costs.  
Consistent with our alternative hypothesis that excess endowments are associated 
with agency problems that render NFPs less efficient, we find in Column I that PROG 
EXP RATIO is negatively correlated with Ex Endow. This result continues to hold when 
we control for the relation between PROG EXP RATIO and negative excess endowments 
in Column II. The significant negative relation between PROG EXP RATIO and excess 
endowments holds for firms with positive endowments; there is no relation for firms with 
negative excess endowments. Finally, in Column III, we find a negative relation between 
PROG EXP RATIO and the large endowment indicator variable, Q4 Ex Endow. In terms 
of economic significance, firms in the highest quartile of excess endowment have a ratio 
of program service expenses to total expenses that is 1.77% smaller than firms in the 
bottom three quartiles of excess endowment.  For the average firm in the sample, this 
ratio would decrease by 2.18% from 81.27% to 79.50%. Overall, the results in Columns I 
through III in Table 5 show a negative relation between excess endowment and program 
expenses, which supports our alternative hypothesis that excess endowments are 
associated with agency problems and lower expenditures on charity. 
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As discussed above, in our Table 5 regressions we control for potential incentives 
to manipulate using Contributions%it-1 and Liabilitiesit-1. If the dominant effect of 
Contributions%it-1 is manipulation, then we expect it to be positively associated with 
program expenses. Alternatively, in the absence of manipulation, firms that raise more 
contributions will have greater fundraising expense and lower program expense. The 
estimated negative coefficient on Contributions%it-1 in Table 5 suggests that this latter 
economic effect dominates manipulation in our sample. The estimated positive 
coefficient on Liabilitiesit-1 in the Table 5 regressions is consistent with Krishnan et al.'s 
hypothesis that firms with greater financial distress engage in more manipulation.  
However, we note that although our findings on the relation with excess endowment hold 
in the presence of these controls for potential manipulation, they also hold if we remove 
these controls or enter them separately in our regressions. 
As a second means of addressing the concern that under-endowed firms 
manipulate program expenses upward, we divide the sample based on expected 
manipulation. We follow Krishnan et al. in defining as clear "manipulators" those firms 
with zero fundraising expenses although they receive contributions and have no 
permissible reason for not reporting fundraising expenses. We then estimate separate 
regressions for the 16,796 "manipulators" and the 24,956 remaining observations.  We 
find significant negative associations between excess endowment and program expenses 
in both subsamples (untabulated). If this relation were spuriously induced by 
manipulation, we would not expect to see a relation in either subsample. In addition, our  
results for the low-manipulation firms are virtually identical to those shown in Column 
III for the full sample. Overall, we find no evidence that the negative relation between 
 
 26
excess endowments and program expenses is induced by manipulation; instead, the 
relation appears to reflect agency problems. 
As discussed above, an accumulation of excess endowment funds may indicate 
that the firm anticipates growth opportunities. Firms with growth opportunities could 
have higher fundraising expenses and lower program expenses, and for these firms, we 
could observe a negative association between excess endowments and program expenses 
for reasons unrelated to agency problems. Although our results above suggest growth 
opportunities are not the reason for excess endowment for most firms, it is conceivable 
that our finding of a negative relation between excess endowment and efficiency could be 
driven by the minority of excess endowment firms that show substantial growth. To 
address this concern, in Table 5 – Column VI, we divide firms with excess endowment 
into those with Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow. As described above, these 
variables require data on one-year-ahead endowment. This requirement reduces the 
sample size to 32,949 observations and is the reason we do not include these variables in 
the main tests. As shown in Column VI, we find that both Persistent Ex Endow and 
Transitory Ex Endow are associated with lower PROG EXP RATIO, confirming that our 
results hold within the subsample of firms that is not characterized by growth 
opportunities.11  
Insert Table 5 here 
5.5 The Association between Excess Endowments and Compensation 
In Tables 6 and 7, we test Hypothesis 2 and present results from OLS regressions 
of the compensation variables on proxies for excess endowment and control variables. 
                                                 
11 If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional 
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same. 
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Table 6 first examines the relation between excess endowments and CEO compensation, 
CEO COMP.  
Consistent with Hallock (2002), we find in all specifications that CEO COMP is 
positively associated with contributions and with our size proxy, total expenses.12 We 
also find a positive coefficient on Zero Contributions. The magnitude of the coefficient 
on Zero Contributions indicates that CEOs who raise no contributions earn about the 
same compensation as CEOs who raise an average amount of funds.13   
As in Table 5, we again use multiple measures of excess endowment in our 
Tables 6 and 7 regressions.  In Column I, we use a continuous excess endowment 
variable (Ex Endow) as a proxy for the presence of agency problems. Consistent with our 
prediction in Hypothesis 2, CEO COMP exhibits a positive association with excess 
endowment, and is significant at a 10% level. The coefficient indicates that compensation 
increases by 3.6% when excess endowment increases by one standard deviation. Column 
II presents the results with the continuous excess endowment variable separately for firms 
with positive and negative excess endowments. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the 
estimated coefficient for excess endowment is positive and statistically significant for 
positive endowment firms. Also consistent with our predictions, and the intuition in Opler 
et al. (1999), we find no significant relation between excess endowment and CEO 
compensation for negative endowment firms. Column III shows that the significant 
positive relation between excess endowments and CEO COMP is robust to using Q4 Ex 
                                                 
12 Hallock uses total assets as a size proxy, but this variable is confounded in our tests by the fact that total 
assets are larger when endowments are larger. We obtain very similar results if we use the logarithm of 
“normal” assets (assets less abnormal endowment) instead of expenses in the regression model.  
13 The coefficient on Zero Contributions is 0.36, which is similar to the 0.37 compensation effect for CEOs 
with average contributions.  (0.37 is equal to the product of the 0.03 coefficient on Log Contributions and 
the 12.47 average log contribution). One explanation for this finding is that the CEOs who raise no funds 
manage firms in which contributions are not important and therefore not used as a performance measure.  
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Endow as a proxy for large excess endowments (coded as ‘1’ for firms in the top quartile 
of excess endowment in a given year). In terms of economic significance, firms in the 
highest quartile of excess endowment pay their CEOs approximately 8% more than firms 
in the bottom three quartiles. 14  
An alternative explanation for our finding that CEO compensation and excess 
endowment are positively correlated is that large endowments proxy for management 
quality, and higher quality managers receive more pay.  Two major types of management 
quality are ability to manage growth opportunities and efficiency, either in fundraising or 
in managing the NFP. Our results above show that firms with excess endowments are less 
efficient, so the data do not support the conjecture that high-endowment managers are 
more efficient. Our results above also indicate growth opportunities are not the reason for 
excess endowments for most firms. However, it is conceivable that the positive relation 
between CEO compensation and excess endowment is driven by the minority of firms 
that do show substantial growth and who require higher quality executives to carry out 
this growth. To address this concern, in Column IV, we again divide firms with excess 
endowment into those with Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow. As described 
above, this requirement reduces the sample size to 32,763 observations. As shown in 
Column IV, we find that both Persistent Ex Endow and Transitory Ex Endow are 
associated with higher CEO compensation, confirming that our results hold within the 
subsample of firms that is not characterized by growth opportunities.15 
                                                 
14 If we substitute the program expense ratio for excess endowment in the compensation regression, we find 
that firms with a higher program ratio pay lower compensation. This negative association is consistent with 
agency problems being manifested by low program expense ratios and high compensation.  
15 If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional 
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same. 
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Insert Table 6 here 
Table 7 presents results with O&D COMP% as a proxy for agency costs. Our 
controls for size and performance are significant and of the predicted sign.16 Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, the results in Column I show that O&D COMP% is positively related 
to Ex Endow. Column II shows that there is a significant positive association between 
compensation and Ex Endow when there is an excess of endowment, and an unexpected 
negative association when there is a deficit of endowment. One interpretation of this 
negative relation for low endowments is that firms with extremely low endowments 
require executives that are highly skilled in fundraising, and that it requires more effort 
and talent to run an under-endowed institution. A second interpretation is that firms with 
very small endowments are near distress, and compensation is higher to reflect additional 
termination risk.  
Column III shows a positive relation between O&D COMP% and the indicator 
variable for large excess endowments, implying that officers and directors of firms in the 
top quartile of excess endowment receive higher pay. In terms of economic significance, 
firms in the extreme quartile of excess endowment have a 0.40% greater ratio of officer 
and director compensation to expenses compared to the firms in the bottom three 
quartiles.  An increase of 0.40% in the officer and director pay ratio implies a 14% rise in 
the average O&D COMP% of 2.89%.  
Finally, in Column IV, we divide firms with excess endowment into those with 
                                                 
16 Note our finding that larger firms pay less officer and director compensation as a percentage of expenses 
is consistent with our results in Table 6, which show a coefficient of 0.30 when log(compensation) is 
regressed on log(size). This means that compensation increases at a decreasing rate with firm size, which 
implies that pay as a fraction of expenses decreases as expenses increase.  Regression analysis (not 
tabulated) shows that we obtain the same inference if we instead use log of O&D compensation as a 
dependent variable. 
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Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow in order to assure that our results are not 
driven by firms with substantial growth. We find that both Persistent Ex Endow and 
Transitory Ex Endow are associated with higher O&D COMP%, indicating that our 
results hold for the substantial majority of firms that are not using endowment to finance 
growth, and reinforcing our hypothesis that excess endowments are associated with 
agency problems.17 
Insert Table 7 here 
In summary, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show a positive relation between excess 
endowment and both CEO as well officer and director compensation. These findings 
corroborate our findings in Table 5 that excess endowments are associated with agency 
problems. 
6.  Robustness tests 
Our measure of endowment assumes that all of the funds in the endowment are 
equally accessible to management and equally give rise to potential agency problems. In 
fact, many NFPs have endowments with assets that are restricted to specific uses by 
donors, such as certain capital projects or serving the needs of specific clientele (e.g., 
scholarships for low-income students). Restricted assets may limit the discretion of 
management with respect to these funds, thereby lowering potential agency problems. In 
addition, donors may put restrictions on assets in settings where agency problems are 
known to be large. On the other hand, restrictions can impede the efficient functioning of 
the charity. For example, if restrictions are too tight, these assets are not useful as 
precautionary savings, and total endowment holdings must be greater as a result. 
                                                 
17 If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional 
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same. 
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Although we have no clear prediction on the relation between restricted assets and 
agency problems, we re-estimate our measure of excess endowments from Table 2 and 
our regressions in the Column III of Tables 5, 6, and 7 after eliminating the portion of 
endowment assets that is restricted. We compute Unrestricted_Endow as unrestricted 
assets (line 67) deflated by total expenses (line 17). These data come from a separate 
NCCS "digitized" database that contains more detail from Form 990s but is available 
only for the period of 1998 to 2001. This data requirement reduces the sample to 16,381 
observations. We report these results in Table 8. On this smaller sample, we find that our 
results are qualitatively the same as those shown in Tables 5 to 7: Unrestricted excess 
endowment exhibits a significant negative association with program expenses, and 
significant positive associations with both CEO compensation and officer and director 
compensation.  However, the coefficient magnitudes of these associations appear to be 
larger than those shown above. 
Insert Table 8 here 
Our final robustness check considers the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion 
of healthcare organizations, which are primarily hospitals and comprise over forty 
percent of our sample.  As noted by Weisbrod (1988) and Fisman and Hubbard (2002), 
healthcare appears to be systematically different from other NFP activities. In particular, 
hospitals face for-profit competition and may behave more like for-profit organizations.  
Second, hospitals are significant issuers of tax-exempt debt and use the proceeds of these 
issuances to increase their endowments (Gentry, 2002).  Consistent with the approach in 
Fisman and Hubbard (2002), to ensure that our results are not driven by these 
organizations, we remove them from the sample and re-estimate our model of excess 
 
 32
endowments.  We then use the residuals from this model to re-run our tests in Tables 5, 6, 
and 7.  The results for the full sample are qualitatively similar to those reported above for 
program expenses and CEO compensation, i.e., firms in the top quartile of excess 
endowments have significantly lower program expenses and significantly higher CEO 
compensation. The results for officer and director compensation are weaker: the relation 
between the top quartile of excess endowment and pay is positive, but not significant. 
When we omit health-care organizations from the analysis of unrestricted excess 
endowments, however, the results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 8: 
firms in the top quartile of excess endowments have significantly lower program 
expenses and significantly higher CEO compensation and officer and director 
compensation. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine agency problems in NFPs arising from excess holdings 
of endowment assets. Previous research explores agency costs of excess cash holdings in 
for-profit firms, and although the evidence is somewhat mixed, researchers generally find 
that excess cash is associated with excessive acquisitions and investment. Compared to 
cash holdings in for-profit firms, NFPs hold substantially greater assets in their 
endowments. Further, NFPs do not have obvious residual claimants with a strong interest 
and ability to monitor management, and unlike for-profits, it is generally not feasible for 
NFPs to return excess assets to donors. However, the ability of NFP managers to extract 
rents through acquisitions is also very limited. Although Hansmann (1990) conjectures 
the existence of agency problems with excess endowments, and Fisman and Hubbard 
(2002) model optimal endowment levels, it is an open and interesting empirical question 
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as to whether NFP excess endowment holdings result in agency problems. 
Our tests are designed to distinguish between three alternative explanations for 
excess endowments: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems.  
Inconsistent with large endowments anticipating greater firm-specific growth 
opportunities, we find that most firms with excess endowments maintain their excess 
endowments for several years, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not 
exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better 
monitoring, we find that program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for 
firms with excess endowments. We also provide evidence that excess CEO pay and total 
officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find 
that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.  
Corporate governance and executive compensation in NFPs has come under 
intense scrutiny in recent years, and there is increasing concern about these issues among 
regulators. For example, in his June 22, 2004 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance, Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated: 
The issues of governance and executive compensation are closely intertwined. 
We are concerned that the governing boards of tax-exempt organizations are not, 
in all cases, exercising sufficient diligence as they set compensation for the 
leadership of the organizations. There have been numerous recent reports of 
executives of both private foundations and public charities who are receiving 
unreasonably large compensation packages. 
 
Beginning in the summer of 2004, the IRS undertook an aggressive investigation of 
nonprofit governance, as well as the practices nonprofits use to set compensation. Our 
finding that excessive executive compensation is more pervasive at NFPs with excess 
endowments provides insight into the types of not-for-profit organizations where 
governance and executive compensation are less likely to stand up to scrutiny. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics by Industry 
 
 % of Total Observations Endow/Exp 
Revenue 
($ millions) 
Expenses 
($ millions) PPE GR% 
PROGRAM 
GR% 
PROG EXP 
RATIO 
CEO COMP 
($ thousands) 
O&D 
COMP% 
Industry Descriptive          
Arts 6.57 1.34 8.36 6.21 0.04 0.04 75.64 142.39 3.07 
Education 26.10 1.06 22.18 18.80 0.07 0.05 83.16 156.25 1.59 
Health 35.62 0.24 59.01 55.77 0.06 0.05 86.38 215.52 0.71 
Human services 13.13 0.40 9.66 9.13 0.05 0.05 86.39 104.14 1.59 
Other 18.58 0.66 8.30 7.09 0.03 0.05 83.07 128.25 2.65 
          
Sample Descriptive          
Mean  2.01 63.21 58.12 0.11 0.07 81.27 203.11 2.89 
STD  4.36 121.89 114.12 0.25 0.19 14.34 174.17 4.67 
Median  0.49 20.67 18.21 0.05 0.05 84.41 157.50 1.36 
 
This table presents median descriptive statistics by industry for a sample of 41,752 not-for-profit firm-year observations. The four major industries follow the 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) industry classification. The table also presents mean, standard deviation and median descriptive statistics for the 
total sample. Endow/Exp is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total 
expenses (line 17). Revenue is the total revenue (line 12) in millions of dollars. Expenses is the total expenses (line 17) in millions of dollars. PPE GR is the 
change in land, buildings, and equipment (line 57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column (a)) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two 
years). We deflate PPE GR by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROGRAM GR is the 
change in total program services expenses (line 13) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We deflate PROGRAM GR by total expenses 
(line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROG EXP RATIO is total program services expenses (line 13) as a 
percentage of total expenses (line 17). CEO COMP is total CEO compensation (Form 990 – Part V, column (c) + column (d) + column (e)) in thousands of 
dollars. O&D COMP% is officer and director compensation (line 25, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17).  
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Table 2 – Determinants of Benchmark Endowment 
 
Dep. Variable: Endow/Expt Variable Predicted  Sign 
I II 
    
Intercept  7.34*** 9.27*** 
  (7.98) (10.69) 
    
CVREV t + 11.56*** 10.20*** 
  (18.86) (17.41) 
    
Log Revenue t - -0.41*** -0.42*** 
  (-11.52) (-12.08) 
    
Access to Debt t - -0.49*** -0.40*** 
  (-3.72) (-3.13) 
    
CVREV *Access to Debt t - -6.75*** -6.35*** 
  (-10.08) (-9.82) 
    
LABOR% t -  -4.55*** 
   (-14.67) 
R-square (%)  23.71 26.61 
Observations  41,752 41,752 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of benchmark endowment. Endow/Exp is 
the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column 
(b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). CVREV is the coefficient of variation of total revenue (line 12) 
measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue to mean total revenue, both measured in the last 
five years ending at year t. We delete observations with less than four years of data (among the last five years) 
available to compute the coefficient of variation of total revenues. Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of total 
revenue (line 12). Access to Debt is an indicator variable coded ‘1’ if the firm in year t has obtained debt in the 
last ten years ending at year t. We categorize a firm as having debt if it has tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a, 
column (b)) or mortgages and other notes payable (line 64b, column (b)). LABOR% is the total compensation 
for all employees including salaries, pension plan contributions, benefits and taxes (lines 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + 
29, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). Industry, state, and year dummies are included in the 
model but not tabulated in the results. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  
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Table 3 – Persistence of Excess Endowment 
 
Percentage of firms in quartile of excess endowment Time since firm 
enters top quartile of 
excess endowment   Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
     
Year 0    3,034 
    100.0% 
     
Year 1 59 80 428 1,678 
 2.6% 3.6% 19.1% 74.7% 
     
Year 2 85 101 378 1,226 
 4.8% 5.6% 21.1% 68.5% 
     
Year 3 92 87 320 932 
 6.4% 6.1% 22.4% 65.2% 
     
Year 4 72 85 258 764 
 6.1% 7.2% 21.9% 64.8% 
     
Year 5 69 74 206 574 
 7.5% 8.0% 22.3% 62.2% 
 
This table examines the persistence of excess endowment for firms in the highest excess endowment quartile. 
Firms are ranked into quartiles every year based on the excess level of endowment (Ex Endow) at year t.  Ex 
Endow is the residual from the determinants of benchmark endowment regression (Table 2), where endowment 
is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, 
column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Firms are selected based on the first time they enter the highest 
quartile of excess endowment. The firms are followed for the next five years to determine the quartile in which 
they belong in the subsequent years. Quartile 4 represents the highest excess endowment quartile, and Year 0 is 
the starting measurement year. The number of firm years in each quartile, each year, is presented and the 
percentage of firms is in italics. 
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Table 4 – Determinants of Investment and Growth in Program Expenses 
 
Dep. Variable: PPE GR% Dep. Variable: PROGRAM GR% Variable 
1-Year 1-Year 2-Year 1-Year 1-Year 2-Year 
       
Intercept 15.46*** 14.50*** 40.33*** 24.27*** 25.51*** 47.35*** 
 (3.21) (3.73) (3.93) (12.39) (11.93) (12.13) 
       
Log Expensest-1 -0.30** -0.40*** -1.16*** -1.23*** -1.36*** -2.42*** 
 (-2.26) (-2.69) (-3.57) (-14.60) (-13.92) (-13.78) 
       
Q4 Ex Endow t-1 1.58***   2.24***   
 (3.74)   (8.88)   
       
Persistent Ex Endow t-1  0.06 0.26  0.69** -0.16 
  (0.11) (0.24)  (2.42) (-0.35) 
       
Transitory Ex Endow t-1  5.12*** 9.89***  7.04*** 15.86*** 
  (6.27) (6.33)  (11.68) (14.56) 
       
Industry, state, and year 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (%) 3.02 3.33 4.49 1.91 2.70 4.76 
Observations 41,752 32,949 32,949 41,752 32,949 32,949 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of PPE GR% and PROGRAM GR%. PPE 
GR is the change in land, buildings, and equipment (line 57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column 
(a)) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We deflate PPE GR by total expenses (line 17) 
at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROGRAM GR is the change 
in total program services expenses (line 13) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We 
deflate PROGRAM GR by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a 
percentage of total expenses. Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Q4 Ex Endow is 
an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution, 
and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 
is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution at year t+1, and ‘0’ 
otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in 
the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-
statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 5 – Determinants of the Program Expense Ratio 
 
Dep. Variable: PROG EXP RATIO t Variable Predicted Sign 
I II III IV 
      
Intercept  48.80*** 50.37*** 47.68*** 45.23*** 
  (12.99) (13.30) (12.64) (10.64) 
      
Log Expensest-1 + 2.06*** 1.98*** 2.15*** 2.31*** 
  (17.11) (16.60) (17.10) (15.85) 
      
Contributions% t-1 ? -3.37*** -3.31*** -2.93*** -3.27*** 
  (-5.03) (-4.94) (-4.37) (-4.15) 
      
Liabilities t-1 ? 1.20** 1.20** 1.53*** 1.24* 
  (2.16) (2.14) (2.73) (1.88) 
      
Ex Endow t-1 - -0.36***    
  (-5.29)    
      
Positive Ex Endow t-1 -  -0.42***   
   (-4.55)   
      
Negative Ex Endow t-1 0  -0.16   
   (-1.34)   
      
Q4 Ex Endow t-1 -   -1.77***  
    (-5.08)  
      
Persistent Ex Endow t-1 -    -1.94*** 
     (-4.20) 
      
Transitory Ex Endow t-1 -    -1.16*** 
     (-2.93) 
Industry, state,  
and year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (%)  12.63 12.67 12.19 12.62 
Observations  41,752 41,752 41,752 32,949 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of PROG EXP RATIO. PROG EXP RATIO 
is total program services expenses (line 13) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). Log Expenses is the 
natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Contributions% is the ratio of total contributions (line 1d) to total 
revenue (line 12) and Liabilities is the ratio of total liabilities (line 66) to total assets (line 59). Ex Endow is the 
excess level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of benchmark 
endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column 
(b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive (Negative) Ex 
Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.  
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Table 5 – Cont’d 
 
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of 
the distribution, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution 
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at 
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  
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Table 6 – Determinants of CEO Compensation 
 
Dep. Variable: CEO COMP t Variable Predicted Sign 
I II III IV 
      
Intercept  6.27*** 6.22*** 6.28*** 6.35*** 
  (56.45) (53.08) (56.27) (51.11) 
      
Log Expensest-1 + 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
  (52.04) (49.45) (51.89) (44.41) 
      
Log Contributionst + 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (7.69) (7.59) (7.34) (7.09) 
      
Zero Contributionst ? 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 
  (5.97) (5.82) (5.64) (5.45) 
      
Ex Endow t-1 + 0.01*    
  (1.93)    
      
Positive Ex Endow t-1 +  0.01**   
   (2.03)   
      
Negative Ex Endow t-1 0  -0.00   
   (-0.38)   
      
Q4 Ex Endow t-1 +   0.08***  
    (5.52)  
      
Persistent Ex Endow t-1 +    0.07*** 
     (3.79) 
      
Transitory Ex Endow t-1 +    0.08*** 
     (4.08) 
Industry, state, and year 
dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (%)  47.52 47.53 47.63 46.37 
Observations  41,752 41,752 41,752 32,949 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of CEO Compensation (CEO COMP). CEO 
COMP is the natural logarithm of CEO compensation (Form 990 – Part V, column (c) + column (d) + column 
(e)). Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Log Contributions is the natural 
logarithm of total contributions (line 1d). This variable is set to zero if total contributions equal zero. Zero 
Contributions is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if total contributions equal zero, and ‘0’ otherwise. Ex Endow 
is the excess level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of 
benchmark endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 
45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive 
(Negative) Ex Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.  
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Table 6 – Cont’d 
 
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of 
the distribution, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution 
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at 
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  
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 Table 7 – Determinants of Officer and Director Compensation 
 
Dep. Variable: O&D COMP%t Variable Predicted Sign I II III IV 
      
Intercept  30.13*** 28.23*** 30.18*** 29.61*** 
  (24.53) (23.60) (24.58) (20.17) 
      
Log Expensest-1 - -1.65*** -1.55*** -1.66*** -1.61*** 
  (-37.57) (-37.23) (-37.60) (-32.52) 
      
Log Contributionst + 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (4.24) (3.71) (3.97) (3.86) 
      
Zero Contributionst ? 1.97*** 1.73*** 1.91*** 1.97*** 
  (5.75) (5.07) (5.47) (5.12) 
      
Ex Endow t-1 + 0.04**    
  (2.01)    
      
Positive Ex Endow t-1 +  0.12***   
   (4.92)   
      
Negative Ex Endow t-1 0  -0.20***   
   (-5.48)   
      
Q4 Ex Endow t-1 +   0.40***  
    (4.72)  
      
Persistent Ex Endow t-1 +    0.41*** 
     (3.86) 
      
Transitory Ex Endow t-1 +    0.36*** 
     (3.55) 
Industry, state, and year 
dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (%)  34.89 35.31 34.94 34.33 
Observations  41,752 41,752 41,752 32,949 
 
This table presents OLS models of the determinants of Officer and Director Compensation (O&D COMP%).  
O&D COMP% is officer and director compensation(line 25, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 
17). Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Log Contributions is the natural logarithm 
of total contributions (line 1d). This variable is set to zero if total contributions equal zero. Zero Contributions is 
an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if total contributions equal zero, and ‘0’ otherwise.  Ex Endow is the excess 
level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of benchmark 
endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column 
(b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive (Negative) Ex 
Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.  
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Table 7 – Cont’d 
 
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of 
the distributions, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution 
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess 
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at 
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  
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  Table 8 – Alternative Endowment Measure – Unrestricted Assets 
 
Dependent Variable 
Variable 
PROG EXP RATIO CEO COMP O&D COMP%t 
    
Intercept 48.25*** 6.00*** 30.08*** 
 (12.29) (49.34) (27.00) 
    
Log Expensest-1 1.90*** 0.32*** -1.71*** 
 (15.24) (50.03) (-34.09) 
    
Log Contributionst  0.02*** 0.05** 
  (5.03) (2.14) 
    
Zero Contributionst  0.26*** 1.65*** 
  (3.80) (3.72) 
    
Contributions% t-1 -2.21***   
 (-3.35)   
    
Liabilities t-1 1.04*   
 (1.78)   
    
Q4 Ex Unrestricted t-1 -3.34*** 0.15*** 0.57*** 
 (-8.36) (9.33) (4.95) 
    
Industry, state, and year 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 13.32 51.81 37.50 
Observations 16,381 16,381 16,381 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of management and general expenses 
(PROG EXP RATIO), CEO Compensation (CEO COMP), and Officer and Director Compensation (O&D 
COMP%) using an alternative endowment measure. This data is available for the period of 1998 to 2001. 
Unrestricted_Endow is unrestricted assets (line 67) deflated by total expenses (line 17).  We measure excess 
Unrestricted_Endow as the residual of an endowment model equivalent to the specification in Table 3. Q4 Ex 
Unrestricted is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess Unrestricted_Endow at year t-1 is in the top 
quartile of the distributions and ‘0’ otherwise. All other variables are defined as before. T-statistics based on 
Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** 
indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
 
 
